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1.	  Introduction	  Deforestation	   in	   the	   Amazon	   has	   decreased	   from	   23.901	   km2	   in	   2004-­‐2005	   to	   6.348	  km2	   in	  2009-­‐2010	   	   (INPE,	  2012)	  suggesting	   that	   the	  region	  may	  be	  at	  a	   turning	  point	  (Davidson	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Nepstad	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Nepstad	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  In	  2008,	  the	  Brazilian	  government	  set	  a	  target	  to	  reduce	  deforestation	  rates	  in	  2020	  to	  20%	  of	  the	  1996-­‐2005	  level.	  Whilst	  it	  is	  still	  too	  early	  to	  claim	  victory	  (Nepstad	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  recent	  successes	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have	  been	  attributed	  to	  a	  combination	  of:	  several	  innovative	  governance	  measures,	  such	  as	  quasi-­‐instant	  satellite	  monitoring	  (Brito	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  strong	  demonstrations	  of	  force	  by	   regulatory	   authorities,	   market	   sanctions	   (i.e.	   soy	   moratorium,	   beef	   embargo)	  (Barreto	   and	   Araujo,	   2012;	   Nepstad	   et	   al.,	   2009),	   emergence	   of	   local	   governance	  arrangements	   (Brannstrom	   et	   al.,	   2011),	   the	   decentralization	   of	   governance,	   and	  creation	   of	   conservation	   units	   (Soares-­‐Filho	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   Toni,	   2011).	   Designed	   at	  different	  governance	  levels,	  and	  across	  different	  sectors,	  these	  initiatives	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  a	  “governance	  of	  transition”	  (Kemp	  and	  Loorbach,	  2006;	  Kemp	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Voss	  and	  Bornemann,	  2011).	  	  Transitions	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   fundamental	   changes	   in	   society's	   structure,	   culture	   and	  practices	   (Loorbach,	   2010).	   Bringing	   about	   transitions	   has	   become	   a	   world-­‐wide	  concern,	  as	  many	  current	  socio-­‐ecosystems	  are	  under	  pressure	  and	  need	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	   achieve	   sustainable	   development	   regimes	   (Voss	   and	   Bornemann,	   2011).	   Current	  regimes	   are	   shaped	   by	   structural	   determinants,	   which	  may	   lead	   to	   lock-­‐in	   situations.	  Transition	  towards	  sustainable	  regimes	  can	  occur	  through	  the	  progressive	  dismantling	  of	  unsustainable	  structures	  and	  the	  building	  of	  new	  structures	  according	  to	  the	  chosen	  conception	  of	  sustainability,	  in	  a	  creative	  destruction	  process.	  Concomitant	  changes	  are	  necessary	   within	   technological,	   economic,	   ecological,	   sociocultural	   and	   institutional	  sectors,	   each	   change	   reinforcing	   changes	   in	   the	   other	   sectors.	   Managing	   to	   revert	  historical	   trends,	   structural	  barriers	   and	  path-­‐dependency	   is	  quite	   challenging	   (North,	  1997).	   It	   requires	   a	   reflexive	   governance	   process,	   based	   on interaction	   arenas,	  experimentation,	   adaptation	   programs	   and	   continuous	   monitoring	   (Kemp	   and	  Loorbach,	  2006;	  Kemp	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  In	  Brazil,	  one	  of	  the	  spearheads	  of	  this	  “governance	  of	  transition”	  is	  the	  Action	  Plan	  for	  Prevention	   and	   Control	   of	   Deforestation	   in	   the	   Brazilian	   Legal	   Amazon	   (PPCDAm),	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which	  was	  launched	  in	  2004,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Sustainable	  Amazon	  Plan.	  It	  structures	  a	  set	  of	  policies	  around	  three	  main	  goals:	  (i)	  regulating	  land	  tenure	  and	  zoning	  land	  use,	  (ii)	  monitoring	   land	   conversion,	   and	   iii)	   providing	   incentives	   for	   sustainable	   land-­‐use	  activities	   (Barreto	   and	   Araujo,	   2012).	   Its	   underlying	   motivation	   is	   to	   slow	   and	   stop	  activities	   linked	   to	   deforestation	   through	   strong	   command-­‐and-­‐control	  measures,	   and	  simultaneously	   to	   promote	   a	   new	   institutional	   culture	   that	   stimulates	   legal	   activities	  through	  market-­‐based	  incentives,	  social	  control	  and	  capacity	  building.	  Given	  that	  the	  history	  of	  Amazonian	  colonization	  has	  been	  largely	  devoid	  of	  legal	  rules	  (Araújo	   and	   Léna,	   2010;	   Fernandes,	   1999;	   Taravella	   and	   de	   Sartre),	   the	   effective	  implementation	   of	   new	   policy	   instruments	   is	   challenging	   to	   decision	   makers	   and	  stakeholders	  alike,	  and	  requires	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  factors	  which	  would	  bring	  about	  a	  change	  in	  land-­‐use	  practices.	  Although	  case	  studies	  (Boyd,	  2008;	  Brannstrom	  et	  al.,	   2011)	   and	  macro	   assessments	   (Nepstad	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Sparovek	   et	   al.,	   2010)	   take	   a	  positive	  view	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  recent	  initiatives,	  they	  rarely	  single	  out	  the	  effects	  of	  such	  policies	   on	   different	   types	   of	   Amazonian	   landowner1.	   Any	   assessment	   of	   the	  effectiveness	  of	  new	  policy	  measures	  needs	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  motives,	  constraints	  and	  perspectives	  of	  different	  types	  of	  landowner.	  Efforts	  to	  improve	  legal	  compliance	  of	  Amazonian	   landowners	  have	   focused	   largely	  on	   the	  medium	   to	   large-­‐sized	   farms	  who	  are	   more	   sensitive	   to	   market	   influences,	   and	   while	   accounting	   for	   only	   10%	   of	   all	  landowners	  are	  responsible	  for	  almost	  80%	  of	  land2.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  remaining	  90%	  of	  landholders	  are	  responsible	  for	  approximately	  650	  000	  properties,	  including	  the	  most	  impoverished	   inhabitants	   of	   the	   region.	   The	   motivations	   and	   ability	   of	   these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Although	  traditional	  populations	  have	  a	  great	  importance	  in	  the	  Amazon	  region,	  in	  this	  paper,	  we	  focus	  on	  private	  landholders.	  	  2	  In	  the	  IBGE	  Census	  for	  2006,	  in	  the	  Legal	  Amazon	  region,	  there	  were	  642	  127	  properties	  of	  less	  than	  200	  ha	  (amounting	  to	  23	  million	  ha),	  and	  72	  882	  properties	  with	  more	  than	  200	  ha	  (amounting	  to	  87	  million	  ha)	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smallholders	   to	   comply	   or	   not	   with	   rules	   are	   very	   different	   from	   those	   of	   larger	  landowners	  and	  need	  urgent	  attention	  as	  part	  of	  the	  broader	  transition	  process.	  	  The	   overall	   aim	   of	   the	   foregoing	   analysis	   is	   to	   improve	   understanding	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   different	   policies	   are	   capable	   of	   exerting	   different	   influences	   on	   levels	   of	  environmental	   compliance	  across	  different	  groups	  of	   actors.	   In	  particular	  we	   focus	  on	  trying	   to	   understand	   those	   policy	   levels	   that	   are	   capable	   of	  motivating	   change	  within	  smallholder	   communities.	   We	   will	   thus	   first	   present	   why	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	  compliance	   motivations	   is	   required	   and	   why	   they	   may	   differ	   for	   large	   and	   small	  landholders.	   Then,	   we	   will	   analyze	   differing	   levels	   and	   perceptions	   of	   environmental	  compliance	   across	   a	   broad	   spectrum	   of	   landowners	   in	   two	   regions	   of	   the	   eastern	  Brazilian	   Amazon	   where	   recent	   governance	   initiatives	   have	   attempted	   to	   influence	  private	   land	   management.	   We	   consider	   three	   transition	   goals:	   limiting	   deforestation,	  improving	   legal	   compliance	   within	   private	   properties,	   and	   encouraging	   sustainable	  activities.	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2.	  Environmental	  policies	  and	  compliance	  	  
2.1.	  Understanding	  compliance	  Environmental	  regulations	  are	  varyingly	  interpreted,	  modified	  and	  ignored	  by	  actors	  at	  different	   levels	   of	   social	   organization,	   leading	   to	   differences	   in	   “rules	   in	   use”	   (Farber,	  1999;	  Ostrom,	  1990).	  The	  behavior	  of	  people	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  rules	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  regulate	  their	  actions	  is	  defined	  as	  compliance	  (Hauck,	  2007).	  The	  efficiency	  of	  a	  set	  of	  regulations	  depends	  critically	  on	  achieving	  a	  high	  level	  of	  compliance.	  Understanding	  differences	   in	   compliance	   and	   the	   potential	   for	   improvements	   to	   existing	   policies	  requires	  an	  understanding	  of	  differences	  in	  motivations	  and	  rule	  interpretation	  among	  different	  actors.	  Previous	   work	   indicates	   that	   motivations	   for	   compliance	   include	   fear	   of	   the	   law,	  economic	  incentives,	  established	  social	  norms,	  personal	  consciousness,	  and	  differences	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  comply	  (Gezelius	  and	  Hauck,	  2011;	  May,	  2004;	  Winter	  and	  May,	  2001).	  Gezelius	  and	  Hauck	  (2011)	  suggested	   that	  compliance	   is	   influenced	  by	  both	   the	  wider	  institutional	   context	   and	   its	   interaction	   with	   individual	   or	   group	   conditions.	   For	  example,	  deterrence	  (fear	  of	  being	  caught)	  is	  a	  compliance	  motivation	  which	  depends	  on	  the	  level	  of	  enforcement	  of	  the	  state	  (level	  of	  control	  and	  size	  of	  penalty).	  	  
2.2.	  Compliance	  motivations	  regarding	  different	  policies	  One	  of	  the	  central	  challenges	  of	  transition	  politics	  is	  to	  encourage	  a	  progressive	  change	  in	   norms	   that	   results	   in	   an	   increased	   acceptability	   of	   new	   regulations.	   First	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	   identify	   the	   institutional	   conditions	  set	  by	  different	   types	  of	  policies,	  and	  how	  may	  they	  influence	  levels	  of	  compliance.	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Command-­and-­control	  policies	  have	   long	  been	  seen	  as	  a	  major	  policy	   instrument.	  They	  can	  act	  through	  increased	  monitoring	  and	  control,	  increases	  in	  the	  size	  of	  penalties	  and	  changes	  to	  the	  style	  of	  inspections	  (May,	  2004).	  The	  efficiency	  of	  command-­‐and-­‐control	  policies	  depends	  upon	  the	  risks	  perceived	  by	  actors	  of	  being	  caught	  and	  punished,	   the	  benefits	  of	  not	  complying	  with	   the	   law,	  as	  well	  as	  on	   levels	  of	   respect	   for	   law	  and	   the	  State	   (Gezelius	  and	  Hauck,	  2011).	  However,	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   command-­‐and-­‐control	  policies	   is	   questionable	   for	   areas	  where	   the	   capacity	   for	   state	   enforcement	   is	   lacking,	  where	   policy	   making	   is	   greatly	   biased	   by	   political	   interests	   and/or	   conducted	   out	   of	  context	  of	  the	  practical	  realities	  of	  regions	  where	  laws	  are	  intended	  to	  be	  applied.	  	  	  
	  
Market-­based	   instruments	  have	  been	  viewed	  as	  a	  possible	  alternative	  to	  command-­‐and	  control	   policies.	   They	   appeal	   to	   an	   actors’	   rational	   economic	   interest	   to	   achieve	  compliance	  through	  taxes	  or	  incentives,	  or	  may	  also	  place	  conditions	  on	  the	  production	  process	   to	  have	   access	   to	   certain	  markets	   (certification).	   Payments	   for	  Environmental	  Services	   (PES)	   have	   been	   proposed	   as	   a	   way	   of	   securing	   the	   production	   of	   positive	  environmental	  externalities	  (Engel	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  though	  success	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  the	  market	   incentives,	   but	   also	   on	   a	   series	   of	   other	   institutional	   factors	   (e.g.	   land	   rights,	  degree	  of	  social	  organization)	  (Muradian	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  
Institutional	   arrangements	   and	   social	   regulations,	   including	   trust,	   the	   need	   for	  recognition	   within	   a	   group,	   and	   moral	   beliefs	   have	   gained	   increased	   importance	   in	  analyses	   of	   compliance	   motivations	   (Ostrom,	   2005).	   Policies	   to	   promote	   such	  arrangements	  are	  generally	  based	  on	  efforts	  to	  decentralize	  power	  and	  control	  (Agrawal	  and	   Ostrom,	   2001;	   Ostrom,	   1998).	   Decentralization	   is	   intended	   to	   give	   greater	  legitimacy	  to	  rules,	  as	  they	  become	  better	  adapted	  to	   local	  contexts,	  and	  thus	  ought	  to	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encourage	   higher	   levels	   of	   compliance.	   Nevertheless,	   local	   enforcement	   capacity	  remains	  an	  important	  precondition	  (Gibson	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  and	  local	  power	  dynamics	  may	  still	   lead	   to	   rule	   deviation	   or	   concentration	   of	   control	   within	   special	   interest	   groups,	  thus	  undermining	  the	  motivation	  for	  others	  to	  comply	  (Ribot,	  2005).	  	  One	   of	   the	   criticisms	   made	   of	   command-­‐and-­‐control,	   market-­‐incentive	   and	  decentralization	  policies	  is	  that	  they	  generally	  work	  best	  under	  constant	  conditions	  and	  do	   little	   to	   promote	   learning	   dynamics	  which	   are	   fundamental	   to	   bring	   about	   change	  (Boyd,	   2008;	   Voss	   and	   Bornemann,	   2011).	   By	   contrast	   pro-­‐active	   policies	   for	  empowerment,	   capacity	   building	   and	   innovation	   can	   help	   create	   the	   space	   for	   new	  knowledge	   and	   perceptions	   to	   emerge,	   for	   social	   interaction,	   and	   social	   learning	  (Leeuwis	   and	   Pyburn,	   2002).	   Whilst	   nobody	   can	   be	   “complied	   to	   learn"	   there	   are	  motivations	   linked	   to	   an	   awareness	   of	   a	   need	   to	   change,	   willingness	   and	   ability	   to	  participate	  in	  this	  change	  (Marshall	  and	  Marshall,	  2007).	  	  	  The	  ability	  to	  change	  and	  adapt	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  individual	  characteristics	  but	  also	  on	  the	  opportunities	  offered	  by	  the	  institutional	  context	  and	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  actor	  to	  benefit	  from	  these	  opportunities,	  as	  determined	  by	  differing	  power	  relations,	  networks,	  knowledge	   and	   education,	   and	   resources	   (Sen,	   1989).	   Capacity	   is	   also	   linked	   to	   an	  awareness	  of	  regulations	  and	  incentives	  (Winter	  and	  May,	  2001),	  with	  awareness	  acting	  as	  an	  important	  precondition	  for	  all	  other	  compliance	  motivations	  to	  be	  activated.	  	  	  
2.3.	  Environmental	  policies	  for	  transition	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  Amazon	  Transition	   in	   the	   Amazon	   is	  manifest	   primarily	   as	   command-­‐and-­‐control	  measures	   to	  control	   deforestation.	   The	   creation	   of	   conservation	   reserves	   has	   reduced	   the	   rate	   of	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forest	  conversion	  to	  agriculture	  (Toni,	  2011),	  but,	  because	  a	  large	  area	  of	  land	  is	  under	  private	  ownership,	  control	  of	  this	  land	  has	  remained	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  attention	  (Ferreira	  and	   al.	   2012).	   Even	   before	   the	   settlement	   of	   the	   Amazon	   in	   the	   1960s,	   the	   Federal	  government	   had	   put	   in	   place	   measures	   to	   control	   changes	   in	   land	   cover	   (especially	  deforestation)	   through	   a	   Forest	   Act	   dating	   back	   to	   1936.	   Currently	   under	   reform	  (Sparovek	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  this	  Forest	  Act	  requires	  the	  set	  aside	  of	  a	  Legal	  Reserve	  –	  LR	  -­‐	  of	  native	  vegetation	  on	  each	  property.	   In	   the	   tropical	   forest	   zone	  of	   the	  Amazon	  region3,	  the	  LR	  was	   initially	   set	   to	  50%	  of	   the	  property	   (1965),	  and	  subsequently	   increased	   to	  80%	  in	  1996.	  This	  change	  meant	  that	  landowners	  who	  had	  been	  compliant	  with	  the	  law	  became	   non-­‐compliant	   (Sparovek	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   A	   number	   of	   subsequent	   measures	  attempted	  to	  provide	  a	  level	  of	  flexibility	  in	  compliance,	  including	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  size	  of	   LRs	   to	   50%	   of	   properties	   in	   “consolidated	   agricultural	   regions”,	   as	   defined	   by	  Ecological	  Economic	  Zoning	  (ZEE)	  plans.	  	  	  	  A	  precondition	  to	  improving	  the	  control	  of	  deforestation	  and	  law	  enforcement	  of	  private	  properties	  was	   to	   regularize	   the	   land	   registry	   of	   property	   boundaries	   and	   rights.	   The	  “Terra	  Legal”	  program	  was	  launched	  by	  the	  Federal	  government	  in	  2008	  to	  achieve	  this,	  but	   rapidly	   encountered	   serious	   bureaucratic	   complications	   in	   verifying	   documents	  supplied	   as	   proof	   of	   ownership.	   A	   pragmatic	   compromise	   solution	   was	   suggested	  whereby	  land	  “owners”	  could	  self-­‐declare	  their	  property	  limits4	  and	  areas	  dedicated	  to	  production	   and	   conservation	   under	   an	   instrument	   known	   as	   CAR	   –	   the	   Rural	  Environmental	   Land	  Registry.	   CAR	   does	   not	   ensure	   land	   tenure;	   it	   assigns	   ownership	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  In	  the	  Amazon	  region,	  the	  Forest	  Act	  distinguishes	  tropical	  forest	  zones,	  dry	  forest	  zones	  (cerrado)	  and	  natural	  pasture	  zones.	  	  4	  through	  GPS	  references	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only	   for	   monitoring	   purposes	   (specifically	   regarding	   compliance	   to	   environmental	  legislation).	  	  	  To	   encourage	   adoption	   of	   CAR,	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   have	   emerged	   to	   exclude	  landowners	  who	  have	  not	  yet	  registered,	  including	  mechanisms	  to	  limit	  access	  to	  credit	  or	   control	   the	   sale	   of	   agricultural	   commodities.	   The	   CAR	   provides	   only	   a	   first	   step	   in	  monitoring	  and	  controlling	  deforestation.	  The	  second	  step	  for	  private	  landowners	  is	  to	  secure	  a	  LAR	  (the	  Rural	  Environmental	  Licence),	  which	  regulates	  all	  activities	  within	  the	  property	  and	  identifies	  necessary	  steps	  to	  ensure	  full	  compliance	  with	  the	  Forest	  Act.	  	  	  
2.4	  Possible	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  policies	  to	  bring	  about	  environmental	  compliance	  Command-­‐and-­‐control	  policies	  in	  the	  Amazon	  are	  limited	  because	  of	  the	  remoteness	  of	  many	   regions	   and	   the	   limited	   capacity	   and	   centralization	   of	   agencies	   responsible	   for	  control.	   Estimated	   costs	   for	   regulatory	   enforcement	   are	   still	   very	   high	   (Börner	   et	   al.,	  2011).	  Low	   levels	  of	  effective	  enforcement	  have	   led	   to	  a	   low	   level	  of	  perceived	  risk	  of	  being	  caught,	  especially	  for	  small	  areas	  of	  deforestation.	  	  Market-­‐based	  incentives	  for	  compliance	  have	  been	  used	  by	  a	  number	  of	  public-­‐private	  initiatives	  (Brannstrom	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  enabling	  a	  more	  focused	  control	  on	  specific	  	  chains	  of	  production	   (e.g.	   soy,	   beef,	  wood).	   Sanctions	  on	   credit	   and	  market	   access	  have	  been	  particularly	   effective,	   especially	   regarding	   larger	   producers.	   Positive-­‐incentive	   based	  policies	  such	  as	  certification	  or	  PES	  are	  still	  relatively	  rare.	  	  Social	  regulations	  and	  local	  controls	  of	  deforestation	  may	  be	  strong	  in	  some	  traditional	  communities,	   but	   in	   land	   settlements	   and	   colonies	   (which	   have	   progressively	   turned	  into	   townships),	   norms	   are	   often	   still	   oriented	   by	   the	   behavior	   of	   original	   colonists	  which	  are	  often	  not	  oriented	   towards	   forest	   conservation	   (Taravella	  and	  de	  Sartre).	  A	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certain	  level	  of	  awareness	  is	  emerging	  regarding	  new	  knowledge	  networks	  (Boyd,	  2008)	  and	   soft	   governance	   initiatives	   (Brannstrom	   et	   al.,	   2011),	   but	   examples	   are	   largely	  limited	   to	   places	  with	   strong	   leaders,	  who	   often	   happen	   to	   be	   the	   bigger	   landowners	  (Araújo	  and	  Léna,	  2010).	  	  For	  all	   these	  policies,	  property	  size	  seems	  to	  be	  an	   important	   factor	   in	   influencing	   the	  motivations	  for	  environmental	  compliance	  (Table	  1).	  	  	  
Table	  1.	  Hypotheses	  regarding	  the	  conditioning	  effect	  of	  property	  size	  on	  different	  policy	  
approaches	  to	  achieving	  environmental	  compliance	  
Probable	  influence	  of	  property	  size	  on	  
compliance	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Depends	  on…	  
Small	  properties	   Large	  properties	  
Government	  
enforcement	  
Probability	  of	  detection	  of	  illegal	  behavior	  	  
Weak	  or	  no	  effect	  as	  too	  small	  and	  numerous	  	   Higher	  probability	  of	  being	  monitored	  and	  controlled	  
Market	  control	   Size	  and	  location	  of	  market,	  size	  of	  production	  and	  dependence	  on	  credit	  	  
Weak	  as	  rarely	  exposed	  to	  export	  markets	  unless	  full	  chain	  of	  custody	  is	  required	  (e.g.	  for	  cattle	  certification)	  	  
Strong	  incentive	  to	  become	  legalized	  to	  ensure	  market	  access	  
Social	  
regulation	  
Strength	  of	  existing	  social	  norms	   Stronger	  in	  traditional	  community	  and	  older	  settlements,	  but	  often	  weak	  in	  young	  colonies	  
Historically	  low	  due	  to	  early	  incentives	  to	  deforest	  	  
Capacity	  to	  
change	  
Access	  to	  technology,	  technical	  knowledge	  and	  costs	  of	  
Weak	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  and	  knowledge	  of	  
Potentially	  high,	  especially	  among	  properties	  with	  more	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Level	  of	  information	  and	  education	   Can	  have	  high	  environmental	  consciousness	  but	  accompanied	  by	  a	  low	  awareness	  of	  rules	  
Environmental	  consciousness	  variable	  but	  often	  accompanied	  by	  a	  high	  awareness	  of	  rules	  	  The	   susceptibility	   of	   different	   actor	   groups	   to	   different	   policies	   aimed	   at	   improving	  environmental	   compliance	   therefore	   depends	   strongly	   on	   levels	   of	   wealth	   and	  education,	   as	  well	   as	   historical	   and	   cultural	   determinants	   of	   rural	   livelihoods	   and	   the	  incentives	  for	  original	  colonization.	  	  	  
3.	  Methodology	  
3.1	  Focusing	  on	  “deforested	  Amazonia”	  The	   study	   is	   focused	   on	   two	   regions	   in	   eastern	   Pará:	   Santarém-­‐Belterra	   and	  Paragominas.	   The	   recent	   history	   and	   agricultural	   development	   of	   these	   regions	   is	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  development	  of	  two	  major	  federal	  highways,	  the	  BR-­‐163	  and	  BR-­‐010	  respectively.	  Between	  2001	  and	  2010,	  Paragominas	   is	  2nd	  of	   the	  deforestation	  list	  (over	  the	  Legal	  Amazon	  773	  municipalities),	  and	  Santarem	  is	  between	  16th	  and	  24th,	  	  depending	  on	  the	  year	  (Prodes)5.	  Both	  regions	  host	  important	  pilot	  initiatives	  regarding	  land-­‐use	  sustainability	  in	  the	  Amazon.	  In	  the	  municipalities	  of	  Santarém	  and	  Belterra	  a	  partnership	   between	   The	   Nature	   Conservancy	   (TNC)	   (an	   international	   conservation	  NGO),	   and	   the	  multinational	   Cargill	   resulted	   in	   2006	   from	   a	  moratorium	   on	   soybean	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  http://www.dpi.inpe.br/prodesdigital/prodesmunicipal.php	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production	   from	   deforested	   areas.	   In	   Paragominas,	   the	  Municipio	   Verde	   project	   was	  initiated	   in	  2008	  to	  bring	  the	  municipality	  out	  of	   the	  federal	  governments'	   list	  of	  most	  deforesting	   municipalities.	   Through	   collaboration	   between	   the	   local	   government,	   the	  local	   farmers	  union	  and	   leading	  environmental	  NGOs	   (TNC	  and	   Instituto	  do	  Homem	  e	  Meio	  Ambiente	  da	  Amazonia,	  IMAZON)	  a	  strong	  commitment	  was	  made	  to	  achieve	  zero-­‐deforestation	  and	  promote	  sustainable	  land	  practices.	  	  This	  work	  was	  conducted	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Rede	  Amazônia	  Sustentável6.	  The	  RAS	  network	  emerged	  shortly	  after	  the	  start	  of	  both	  of	  these	  initiatives	  and	  is	  working	  as	  a	  research	  partner	   with	   the	   coordinating	   organizations	   to	   help	   provide	   guidance	   on	   the	  environmental	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   implications	   of	   different	   land-­‐use	   and	   land-­‐management	  options.	  	  	  
3.2.	  Information	  and	  data	  collection	  Analysis	  of	  environmental	  compliance	  was	  conducted	  using	  two	  complementary	  sources	  of	   information	   for	   both	   study	   regions:	   a	   literature	   review	  of	   recent	   policies	   and	   laws;	  and	  a	  quantitative	  survey	  of	  landowners	  collected	  by	  the	  RAS	  network.	  The	  quantitative	  survey	  was	  conducted	  in	  2010	  in	  Santarem	  and	  2011	  in	  Paragominas.	  In	   each	   region,	   18	   catchments	   were	   selected	   along	   a	   gradient	   of	   past	   deforestation,	  ranging	   from	   extensively	   cleared	   landscapes	   with	   less	   than	   20%	   forest	   cover	   to	  landscapes	  with	  100%	  forest	  remaining.	  In	  each	  catchment	  interviews	  were	  carried	  out	  with	   a	   sample	  of	   landowners.	  Qualifying	  properties	  had	   to	  be	  >	  1	  hectare	   in	   size,	   and	  have	  agricultural	  production	  in	  the	  year	  of	  2009	  (reference	  year	  of	  the	  survey).	  Urban	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   RAS	   is	   a	   collaborative	   research	   initiative	   focused	   on	   the	   study	   of	   land-­‐use	   sustainability	   in	   eastern	  Amazonia,	   involving	  more	  than	  30	  institutional	  partners	  from	  Brazil,	   the	  UK	  and	  Australia.	  Coordinating	  institutions	   are	   the	   Goeldi	   Museum	   and	   Embrapa	   Amazônia	   Oriental	   (Belém),	   and	   the	   Universities	   of	  Cambridge	   and	   Lancaster	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom.	   The	   overall	   aim	   of	   RAS	   is	   to	   contribute	   towards	   an	  improved	   understanding	   of	   the	   long-­‐term	   environmental	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   consequences	   of	   current	  land-­‐use	  and	  land-­‐use	  change	  processes	  in	  the	  eastern	  Brazilian	  Amazon	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peri-­‐urban	  areas	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  exhaustive	  sampling	  of	  households.	  Two	  types	  of	   rural	   property	   were	   selected	   for	   the	   survey.	   Firstly,	   we	   interviewed	   farmers	   from	  properties	  in	  which	  RAS	  had	  study	  transects	  for	  biophysical	  data	  collection	  contributing	  between	   5-­‐11	   transects	   per	   catchment.	   These	   properties	   are	   representative	  geographically	  of	   the	   landscape	  though	  tend	  to	  be	   located	   in	   the	   larger	  properties	  and	  are	   thus	   not	   representative	   of	   rural	   producers	   as	   a	   whole.	   Consequently	   we	  complemented	   these	   socioeconomic	   surveys	   with	   a	   random	   sample	   of	   up	   to	   20	  interviews	  (in	  areas	  with	  a	  sufficient	  rural	  population)	  from	  among	  all	  rural	  producers	  in	  the	  catchment.	  The	   total	   survey	   accounts	   for	   475	   interviews,	   165	   from	   Paragominas	   and	   310	   in	  Santarem.	  12	  surveys	  were	  conducted	  in	  the	  FLONA,	  the	  Tapajos	  National	  Forest	  and	  are	  excluded	  from	  this	  analysis	  as	  they	  represent	  a	  distinct	  arrangement	  of	  property	  rights.	  The	   difference	   in	   the	   number	   of	   interviews	   between	   Santarém-­‐Belterra	   and	  Paragominas	   highlights	   an	   important	   distinction	   between	   the	   two	   regions,	   with	   large	  areas	   of	   Paragominas	   having	   a	   low	   population	   density	   and	   being	   dominated	   by	   large	  properties.	  	  
3.3.	  Assessing	  environmental	  compliance	  Table	  2	  illustrates	  the	  variables	  chosen	  to	  analyze	  compliance	  levels,	  according	  to	  each	  of	  the	  three	  broad	  policy	  goal,	  as	  well	  as	  possible	  motivations	  for	  compliance.	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Table	  2.	  Variables	  selected	  for	  analyzing	  compliance	  and	  underlying	  motivations	  
Objective	   Variables	  Reducing	  deforestation	   • Percentage	  of	  the	  property	  with	  primary	  and	  secondary	  forest	  
• Type	  of	  land	  cover	  cleared	  for	  production,	  in	  2000,	  2005	  and	  2009	  Improving	  legality	   • Existence	  of	  Legal	  Reserves,	  CAR,	  and	  LAR	  	  
• Time	  and	  cost	  to	  obtain	  these	  legal	  documents	  
• Awareness	  of	  CAR	  and	  LAR	  Encouraging	  sustainable	  production	  
• Participation	  in	  reforestation	  projects	  
• Reasons	  for	  not	  reforesting	  
• Willingness	  to	  participate	  in	  reforestation	  	  
• Participation	  in	  sustainable	  production	  programs	  
• Awareness	  of	  sustainable	  production	  programs	  or	  compensation	  programs	  
• Familiarity	  with	  debate	  over	  revisions	  to	  Forest	  Act	  	  	  The	   dynamics	   of	   deforestation	   and	   current	   forest	   cover	   are	   evaluated	   here	   on	   a	  declarative	   basis.	   Although	   they	   can	   be	   considered	   subjective	   and	   subject	   to	  misinformation,	   the	   advantage	   is	   that	   they	   include	   small-­‐scale	   deforestation	   in	   small	  properties	  which	  cannot	  be	  detected	  easily	  by	  satellite	  images.	  	  Regarding	   compliance	   motivations,	   other	   than	   awareness	   indicators	   (e.g.	   “have	   you	  heard	  about	   this	   regulation?”	   “have	  you	  never	  heard	  about	   it?”),	   simple	   indicators	  are	  not	  available.	  An	  understanding	  of	  social	  norms,	  environmental	  consciousness,	   level	  of	  deterrence	  require	  a	  deeper	  qualitative	  analysis.	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  To	  test	  our	  hypotheses	  regarding	  differences	  in	  compliance	  according	  to	  the	  size	  of	  properties,	  we	  have	  distinguished	  5	  categories	  of	  property	  size:	  1. 0	  to	  25	  ha:	  very	  small	  properties,	  mainly	  corresponding	  to	  traditional	  subsistence	  farmers	  in	  the	  Amazon	  (since	  periurban	  properties	  were	  not	  part	  of	  the	  sample).	  	  2. 25	  to	  100	  ha:	  these	  will	  generally	  be	  land	  settlements,	  100	  ha	  is	  the	  largest	  possible	  size	  of	  an	  individual	  resettlement	  farm	  under	  Brazil's	  agrarian	  reform	  program	  (INCRA).	  3. 100	  to	  300	  ha:	  one	  important	  legal	  distinction	  in	  farm	  size	  in	  Brazil	  corresponds	  to	  4	  tax	  modules	  (TM),	  with	  legal	  authorizations7	  being	  required	  above	  this	  limit.	  In	   Paragominas,	   1	   TM	   is	   55	   ha	   (4TM=220	   ha);	   in	   Santarem,	   1	   TM	   is	   75	   ha	  (4TM=300	   ha).	   We	   chose	   to	   have	   the	   same	   limit	   for	   both	   municipalities	   to	  simplify	  analyses.	  4. 300	  to	  1000	  ha:	  medium	  to	  large	  size	  properties	  	  5. over	  1000	  ha:	  large	  size	  properties	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Licences	  are	  required	  for	  any	  activity	  related	  to	  agriculture,	  forest	  management,	  fish	  breeding	  or	  silviculture.	  Clearing	  any	  natural	  vegetation	  (such	  as	  deforesting)	  is	  thus	  subject	  to	  licensing.	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3.4.	  Sample	  representativeness	  and	  characteristics	  
Table	  3.	  Total	  sample	  size	  according	  to	  number	  of	  properties	  and	  spatial	  extent	  	  








Total	  area	  	  
(ha)	  
<20ha	   11	   936	   120	   1648	  
20	  -­‐	  100	  ha	   80	   3030	   138	   7491 
100	  -­‐	  200	  ha	   15	   3577	   11	   3689	  
200	  -­‐	  1000	  ha	   20	   8702	   28	   11747	  
>	  1000	  ha	   39	   215612	   13	   52725	  
Total	   165	   231857	   310	   77300	  	  Comparing	  our	  sample	  to	  IBGE	  data	  (2006,	  see	  Table	  A1	  in	  appendix)8,	  in	  Paragominas,	  we	  would	   have	   interviewed	   36%	   of	   the	   total	   number	   of	   registered	   land	   tenures,	   and	  amongst	  them	  almost	  89%	  of	  tenures	  between	  20	  and	  100	  ha,	  probably	   indicating	  the	  huge	   proportion	   of	   small	   properties	   that	   are	   excluded	   from	   the	   national	   census.	   In	  Santarem,	  the	  IBGE	  survey	  identified	  many	  more	  smallholders	  (7325	  property	  <100	  ha	  see	   Table	   A1	   in	   Appendix).	   Although	   our	   sample	   clearly	   favors	   smallholders	   (258	  properties	  out	  of	  310),	  representativeness	  is	  low	  but	  sufficient	  for	  analysis.	  	  Representativeness	  of	  production	   types	   (annuals,	   perennials,	   pasture	  and	   silviculture)	  was	  estimated	  with	  respect	   to	   the	  dominant	   land	  use	  of	  each	  property.	  Proportions	  of	  production	  in	  our	  sample	  are	  close	  to	  the	  IBGE	  data	  (see	  Table	  A2,	  in	  Appendix).	  Paragominas	  is	  clearly	  dominated	  by	  cattle	  ranching,	  as	  well	  as	  having	  a	  recent	  increase	  in	   silviculture.	   Santarem,	   with	   a	   higher	   density	   of	   small	   properties	   has	   many	   more	  properties	   with	   annual	   crops.	   However,	   beyond	   these	   general	   patterns	   dominant	  production	  type	  varies	  considerably	  according	  to	  size	  (see	  Figure	  1;	  and	  Table	  A3).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  To	  match	  IBGE	  categories,	  we	  had	  to	  modify	  our	  usual	  categories	  (limits	  are	  20	  ha,	  100	  ha,	  200	  ha	  and	  1000	  ha,	  instead	  of	  25	  ha,	  100	  ha,	  300	  ha	  and	  1000	  ha).	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Figure	  1.	  Distribution	  of	  land	  use	  (percentage	  of	  total	  area	  of	  all	  properties	  per	  size	  
category)
	  In	   Paragominas,	   almost	   all	   property	   size	   categories	   have	   20%	   more	   pasture	   than	   in	  Santarem.	  Silviculture	  is	  mainly	  restricted	  to	  larger	  properties	  (more	  than	  1000	  ha).	  In	  Santarem,	   properties	   between	   300	   and	   1000	   ha	   (few	   are	   larger	   than	   this)	   are	   often	  dominated	   by	   annuals,	   including	   soy,	   rice	   and	   corn	   cultures	   among	   this	   category.	  Perennials	   are	  mostly	   cultivated	  by	   small	  holders	  and	   restricted	   to	  a	   small	  number	  of	  localities.	  	  	  
4.	  Results	  and	  Discussion	  We	  present	  results	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  three	  broad	  policy	  goals	  for	  transition:	  reducing	  deforestation;	  improving	  legality;	  and	  moving	  towards	  more	  sustainable	  production.	  For	  each	   of	   these	   goals,	  we	  will	   develop	  what	   are	   the	   governance	   conditions,	  what	   is	   the	  level	   of	   compliance	   observed	   in	   our	   sample,	   and	   give	   some	   assumptions	   concerning	  motivations	  of	  compliance,	  mainly	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  awareness	  of	  rules.	  
0%	   10%	   20%	   30%	   40%	   50%	   60%	   70%	   80%	   90%	   100%	  <	  25	  ha	  
25-­‐100	  ha	  100-­‐300	  ha	  300-­‐1000	  ha	  
>	  1000	  ha	  Total	  
<	  25	  ha	  25-­‐100	  ha	  100-­‐300	  ha	  
300-­‐1000	  ha	  >	  1000	  ha	  Total	   %	  forest	  %	  regrowth	  %	  annuals	  %	  perennials	  %	  pasture	  %	  silviculture	  
Paragominas	  
Santarem	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4.1	  Deforestation	  The	   size	   of	   legal	   reserves	   in	   Paragominas	   and	   Santarem	   is	   dependent	   upon	   regional	  zoning	   regulations.	   The	   ZEE	   (Ecological	   and	   Economical	   Zoning)	   of	   BR-­‐163	   was	  approved	   in	   2009,	   defining	   regions	   of	   consolidated	   production	   activities,	   where	   the	  reserve	   size	   is	   50%,	   and	   preservation	   regions,	   where	   the	   limit	   is	   80%.	   The	   zoning	  process	  is	  still	  being	  conducted	  in	  Paragominas.	  Very	  few	  properties	  are	  compliant	  with	  the	  80%	  limit	  with	  only	  7%	  in	  Santarem	  and	  3%	  in	   Paragominas.	   In	   Santarem,	   bigger	   properties	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   have	   80%	   forest	  remaining	  though	  the	  same	  patterns	  does	  not	  hold	  for	  Paragominas.	  When	  considering	  a	  LR	   of	   50%,	   the	   majority	   of	   largest	   properties	   (>	   1000	   ha)	   are	   compliant	   (54%	   of	  properties	   in	  both	  Santarem	  and	  Paragominas).	  By	  contrast	   the	  majority	  of	  very	  small	  properties	  have	  no	  forest	  at	  all	  (more	  than	  60%	  in	  both	  regions).	  	  	  
Figure	  2.	  Extent	  of	  forest	  in	  properties	  of	  different	  size	  class	  in	  Santarem	  and	  Paragominas	  
	  
	  The	  new	  Forest	  Act	  provides	  for	  an	  amnesty	  to	  non-­‐compliant	  properties	  larger	  than	  4	  tax	  modules	  (approximately	  300	  ha)	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  they	  meet	  the	  Legal	  Reserve	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requirement	   within	   a	   given	   time	   period.	   However,	   such	   a	   change	   will	   be	   difficult	   to	  achieve	  for	  properties	  between	  300	  and	  1000	  ha	  (in	  Santarem	  and	  Paragominas,	  50%	  of	  these	  have	  no	  forest,	  and	  many	  others	  less	  than	  25%).	  Given	   their	  current	   “environmental	  deficit”	   (the	  amount	  of	  additional	   forest	  needed	  to	  achieve	   legal	   compliance),	   very	   few	  properties	  may	   legally	   clear	   any	   additional	   forest	  (this	   includes	   any	   vegetation	   regrowth	   of	   more	   than	   5	   years,	   which	   also	   needs	   a	  separate	  authorization	  to	  be	  cleared).	  Figure	  3	  summarises	  the	  types	  of	  forest	  that	  are	  reported	  to	  have	  been	  cleared	  in	  the	  last	  ten	  years.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  3.	  Type	  of	  land	  cover	  cleared	  according	  to	  year	  and	  municipality	  	  













2000	   2005	   2009	  
Young	  regrowth	  Old	  regrowth	  Forest	  Nothing	  
Evolution	  (years)	  
Percentage	  of	  landowners	  having	  cleared	  a	  type	  of	  vegetation	  
Coudel	  et	  al.	  -­	  Compliance	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  Amazon	  -­	  ISEE	  2012	  
	   20	  
Behind	   this	   general	   trend	   a	   number	   of	   interesting	   patterns	   emerge	   when	   comparing	  deforestation	  activity	  across	  property	  size	  categories	  (see	  Figure	  A2	  in	  Appendix).	  Very	  large	   properties	   (>1000	   ha)	   have	   exhibited	   a	   continuous	   decrease	   in	   clearing	   for	   all	  types	   of	   forest	   in	   both	   Santarem	   and	   Paragominas.	   Intermediate	   landholders	   in	  Santarem	   increased	   clearance	  of	   regrowth	   (both	   young	   and	  old)	   in	  2005,	   but	   in	  2009	  came	  back	  to	  the	  2000	  level	  of	  clearance	  (25%	  of	  them).	  Intermediate	  landholders	  have	  stopped	  deforestation,	  but	  compensated	  through	  clearance	  of	  young	  and	  old	  regrowth.	  Small	  properties	  in	  Santarem	  appear	  to	  have	  decreased	  (and	  almost	  stopped)	  clearance	  of	  both	  forest	  and	  old	  regrowth,	  though	  have	  increased	  the	  clearance	  of	  young	  regrowth	  which	  makes	   up	   a	   large	   proportion	   of	  many	   of	   these	   properties.	   	   Small	   properties	   in	  Paragominas	  appear	  to	  have	  increased	  clearance	  of	  both	  forest	  (15%	  of	  them	  still	  clear	  forest	  in	  2009)	  and	  regrowth.	  	  A	  large	  number	  of	  respondents	  did	  not	  to	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  land	  clearance	  (see	  figure	  A2	  in	  appendix),	  which	  may	  be	  because	  they	  have	  forgotten	  or	  because	  they	  are	  reluctant	   to	   admit	   deforestation.	   Response	   rates	   were	   higher	   amongst	   small	   farmers	  who	  have	  less	  to	  lose	  from	  not	  engaging.	  	  
	  
4.2	  Improving	  legalization	  and	  compliance	  	  Environmental	  legalization	  of	  private	  properties	  depends	  on	  acquiring	  three	  documents:	  CAR	   (Rural	   Environmental	   Land	   Registry),	   LR	   (Legal	   Forest	   Reserve)	   and	   LAR	   (Rural	  Environmental	  Licence).	  Since	  2008,	   in	   the	  state	  of	  Pará,	  selling	  to	  slaughterhouses9	   is	  officially	   conditional	   on	   having	   CAR,	   and	   demonstrating	   engagement	   in	   the	   process	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Requirements	  for	  the	  Legal	  Beef:	  http://www.carnelegal.mpf.gov.br/compromissos/pecuaristas	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towards	  acquiring	  LAR.	  Municipalities	  which	  are	  part	  of	  the	  Red	  List	  of	  deforestation10	  can	   exit	   the	   list	   only	   if	   they	   achieve	  80%	  of	   their	   surface	   as	   CAR,	  which	  Paragominas	  achieved	   in	   April	   2010.	   Individual	   legalization	   can	   be	   relatively	   costly,	   though	  partnership	  with	  TNC	  has	  mitigated	  these	  costs	   in	  both	  Santarem	  and	  Paragominas.	   In	  Santarem,	   there	   is	   no	   formal	   market	   requirement	   for	   legalization	   beyond	   a	   need	   to	  demonstrate	  that	  soybean	  crops	  do	  not	  come	  from	  deforested	  areas	  when	  selling	  to	  the	  main	  buyer	  (Cargill).	  According	   to	  our	  data	  (Figure	  2),	   the	  majority	  of	  properties	  over	  300	  ha	  in	  both	  regions	  have	  CAR.	  	  	  
Figure	  2.	  Percentage	  of	  properties	  that	  have	  legal	  documents,	  according	  to	  size	  and	  
municipality	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2011,	   it	   is	  surprising	  that	  we	  found	  no	  evidence	  for	  LAR	  in	  cattle	   farms.	  What	   is	  more	  surprising	  is	  the	  low	  proportion	  of	  LAR	  documents	  compared	  to	  owners	  of	  CAR.	  	  	  Smallholders	   are	  notably	   excluded	   from	   the	  process	  of	  property	   legalization.	  Virtually	  no	   farms	   with	   less	   than	   100	   ha	   have	   CAR,	   and	   only	   20%	   of	   those	   between	   100	   and	  300	  ha.	   In	   agrarian	   reform	   settlements	   (up	   to	   100	   ha),	   the	   federal	   agency	   INCRA	   is	  responsible	  for	  organizing	  the	  CAR.	  Given	  costs	  of	  securing	  a	  CAR	  individually	  (between	  1000	   and	   5000	   reais,	   according	   to	   data	   collected)	   smallholders	   are	   unable	   to	   achieve	  this	   on	   their	   own,	   and	   have	   little	   incentive	   to	   do	   so	   given	   weak	   or	   no	   exposure	   to	  markets.	  However,	  our	  data	  also	  indicate	  that	  60%	  of	  smallholders	  (properties	  less	  than	  100	  ha)	  have	  never	  heard	  of	  CAR	  and	  LAR	  (Figure	  3).	  This	  can	  be	  partly	  explained	  by	  low	   levels	   of	   literacy,	   widespread	   confusion	   about	   legal	   status	   and	   lower	   access	   to	  information	  source.	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4.3	  Towards	  sustainable	  production	  A	   number	   of	   different	   options	   are	   available	   to	   improve	   on	   farm	   income	   without	  requiring	   further	  deforestation,	   including	  sustainable	   intensification,	   reforestation	  and	  forest	  management.	  The	  RAS	  data	  gives	  some	  information	  on	  the	  level	  of	  participation	  to	  sustainable	  production	  programs	  and	  reforestation	  projects.	  	  
Figure	  4.	  Percentage	  of	  properties	  with	  sustainable	  production	  or	  reforestation	  projects	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Although	  most	   properties	   have	   a	   legal	   reserve	  deficit	   few	   landholders	   have	   chosen	   to	  achieve	   legal	   compliance	   through	   reforestation.	   Nevertheless,	   more	   than	   60%	   of	  landowners	  reported	  that	  they	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  reforestation	  project,	  with	  more	  interest	  in	  Santarem	  than	  in	  Paragominas	  	  (Figure	  5).	  	  	  
Figure	  5.	  Landowners	  who	  are	  willing	  (or	  not)	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  reforestation	  project	  
(percentages	  per	  category)	  
	  Considering	   the	   reasons	  why	   individuals	  have	  not	  yet	   engaged	   in	   reforestation	  efforts	  different	  patterns	  appear	  between	  property	  size	  categories	  (Figure	  6).	  Intermediate	  and	  large	   (over	   100	   ha)	   landholders	   demonstrated	   little	   interest	   whilst	   smaller	   farmers	  often	  lack	  appropriate	  knowledge	  and	  resources.	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Figure	  6.	  Reasons	  for	  not	  engaging	  in	  reforestation	  (one	  answer	  only,	  percentage	  
according	  to	  property	  size	  and	  municipality)11	  	  
	  Several	   landholders	   in	   Santarem	   indicated	   that	   there	   was	   a	   lack	   of	   government	  incentives	  (not	  only	  financial,	  but	  also	  technical	  support)	  for	  reforestation	  and	  also	  that	  bureaucracy	   remains	   an	   important	   barrier.	   Awareness	   of	   different	   sustainability	  initiatives	   (such	   as	   sustainable	   production	   programs	   or	   compensation	   for	   not	  deforesting)	  is	  relatively	  high,	  even	  among	  smaller	  holders	  (Figure	  7).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	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  «	  has	  no	  space	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  »	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Figure	  7.	  Awareness	  of	  sustainable	  production	  programs,	  compensation	  programs	  or	  the	  
Forest	  Act	  modifications	  (percentages	  per	  category)	  
	  	  For	  all	  categories,	  awareness	  of	  sustainable	  production	  initiatives	  is	  greater	  in	  Santarem,	  which	  is	  unsurprising	  given	  impact	  of	  the	  soy	  moratorium	  in	  this	  region.	  Awareness	  of	  changes	   in	   the	   Forest	   Act	   is	   greater	   in	   Paragominas	   and	   landholders	   cite	   that	   one	  important	   source	   of	   information	   is	   the	   government,	  which	   is	   not	   at	   all	  mentioned	   by	  landholders	  in	  Santarem.	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depending	  on	   the	  region),	   indicating	   that	   the	  main	  policy	  challenge	   is	  now	  to	   improve	  legalization	  of	  farms	  and	  no	  longer	  in	  reducing	  deforestation.	  	  	  	  	  Substantial	  progress	  has	  already	  been	  achieved	  in	  the	  legalization	  process	  with	  regards	  to	   CAR	   especially	   amongst	   larger	   properties.	   The	   strongest	  motivations	   for	   acquiring	  CAR	  may	  be	   linked	   to	  market	   access	  and	   credit	   sanctions	  and	  not	   always	  due	   to	   legal	  requirements	  (e.g.	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Legal	  Beef	  initiative).	  In	  Santarem,	  although	  CAR	  is	  not	  required	  to	  sell	  soy,	  as	  part	  of	  efforts	  to	  counter	  the	  negative	  image	  from	  the	  2006	  Greenpeace	  campaign,	   the	  main	  exporter,	  Cargill,	   in	  partnership	  with	  TNC	  has	  actively	  promoted	   CAR	   and	   LAR	   amongst	   its	   suppliers.	   Adoption	   of	   LAR	   remains	   very	   low,	  highlighting	  doubts	  regarding	  the	  true	  efficiency	  of	  CAR.	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Rajão	  et	  al.	  (Forthcoming),	   the	   mere	   possession	   of	   CAR	   may	   do	   very	   little	   to	   change	   land-­‐use	  practices,	  and	  may	  even	  legitimize	  deforestation	  (Rajão	  et	  al.,	  Forthcoming).	  As	  such	  the	  process	  of	  legalization	  alone	  is	  evidently	  not	  sufficient	  to	  encourage	  a	  transition	  towards	  more	  sustainable	  farming	  practices.	  	  	  Perhaps	   counter	   intuitively,	   awareness	   of	   incentive	   programs	   (compensation	   for	   not	  deforesting,	  sustainable	  production)	   is	  higher	  than	  awareness	  of	  reforms	  to	  the	  Forest	  Act,	  which	  regulates	  native	  vegetation	  cover	  on	  private	  properties	  -­‐	  suggesting	  that	  soft	  laws	  and	  market	  pressures	  can	  have	  a	  stronger	  effect	  on	  producer	  behavior	  than	  the	  law	  itself	   (Branstromm	   et	   al.	   2011).	   High	   levels	   of	   awareness	   and	   interest	   in	   voluntary	  sustainability	   programs	   raise	   the	   risk	   of	   widespread	   disappointment	   if	   benefits	   (e.g.	  through	  compensation	  or	  preferential	  market	  access)	  are	  not	   forthcoming	  (Nepstad	  et	  al.	  2011).	  Reforestation	  is	  viewed	  relatively	  positively,	  but	  many	  barriers	  still	  have	  to	  be	  addressed	  including	  technical	  capacity	  and	  capital	  costs.	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  The	   most	   striking	   result	   of	   our	   survey	   is	   that	   small	   farmers	   (less	   than	   100	   ha)	   are	  essentially	   excluded	   from	   the	   legalization	   process.	   Approximately	   half	   of	   them	  do	   not	  have	  any	  forest	  remaining	  on	  their	  land	  at	  all.	  In	  Paragominas,	  20%	  of	  landowners	  from	  our	  sample	  are	  still	  clearing	  forest	  or	  old	  regrowth.	  Virtually	  no	  smallholders	  have	  CAR	  (which	   for	   many,	   depends	   on	   INCRA),	   nor	   are	   they	   aware	   of	   its	   necessity	   and	   none	  currently	  participate	  in	  any	  sustainable	  production	  or	  reforestation	  initiative.	  Clearance	  of	   young	   regrowth	   appears	   to	   have	   increased	   in	   many	   places.	   Whilst	   these	   young	  secondary	  forests	  can	  be	  part	  of	  a	  well-­‐managed	  alternative	  system	  (Denich	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  if	   poorly	   managed	   they	   can	   also	   precipitate	   more	   rapid	   degradation	   of	   the	   wider	  landscape,	  e.g.	  through	  the	  impacts	  of	  fire.	  	  These	   findings	   identify	   serious	   shortcomings	   of	   existing	   efforts	   to	   legalize	   rural	  properties	   in	   the	   Brazilian	   Amazon,	   especially	   considering	   that	   Paragominas	   and	  Santarém	  are	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  political	  efforts	  and	  investment	  in	  capacity	  building	  by	  NGOs.	  	  Many	  smallholders	  currently	  feel	  that	  they	  have	  very	  few	  alternatives	  available	  to	  them.	  Whilst	   the	   new	   Forest	   Act	  will	   probably	   not	   expect	   them	   to	   comply	  with	   strict	  environmental	   regulation,	   understanding	   their	   motivations	   and	   capacities	   to	   change	  (Marshall	  and	  Marshall,	  2007),	   remains	  an	  essential	   challenge	   in	  any	  effort	   to	  address	  this	  current	  policy	  gap.	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Appendix.	  Extra	  tables	  and	  figures	  
	  
Table	  A1.	  Representativeness	  of	  sample,	  according	  to	  size	  (percentage	  of	  properties	  
represented	  in	  each	  category)	  














<20ha	   98	   11	   11%	   5461	   120	   2%	  
20	  -­‐	  100	  ha	   90	   80	   89%	   1864	   138	   7%	  
100	  -­‐	  200	  ha	   19	   15	   79%	   858	   11	   1%	  
200	  -­‐	  1000	  
ha	   98	   20	   20%	   113	   28	   25%	  
>	  1000	  ha	   155	   39	   25%	   20	   13	   65%	  
Total	   460	   165	   36%	   8316	   310	   4%	  
	  
Table	  A2.	  Dominant	  production,	  in	  percentage	  of	  properties	  	  	  




2006) 19% 7% 61% 1% 461 
Paragominas (sample) 25% 2% 62% 7% 165 
 Santarem (IBGE 
2006) 57% 6% 23% 0% 9242 
Santarem (sample) 51% 11% 30% 1% 310 
	  
Table	  A3.	  Dominant	  production	  in	  land	  use	  (percentages	  per	  category	  and	  municipality)	  




als Pasture Silvi. Mixed Other NA NB  
<	  25	  ha	   PGM	   43 5 43 2 2 5 0 44 
<	  25	  ha	   STM	   57 17 17 0 1 5 3 149 
25	  -­‐100	  ha	   PGM	   19 2 74 2 2 0 0 47 
25	  -­‐100	  ha	   STM	   43 5 44 1 1 4 3 109 
100	  -­‐300	  ha	   PGM	   30 0 60 0 5 5 0 20 
100	  -­‐300	  ha	   STM	   32 11 53 0 0 5 0 19 
300	  -­‐1000	  ha	   PGM	   40 0 60 0 0 0 0 15 
300	  -­‐1000	  ha	   STM	   80 0 20 0 0 0 0 20 
>	  1000	  ha	   PGM	   5 0 69 23 0 0 3 39 
>	  1000	  ha	   STM	   38 0 31 8 8 8 8 13 
Total  41 7 40 3 1 3 4 487 
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Figure	  A1.	  Deforestation	  dynamic	  in	  Paragominas	  and	  Santarem,	  between	  2001	  and	  2009	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Figure	  A2.	  Type	  of	  land	  cover	  cleared,	  according	  to	  size	  of	  property	  (percentage	  of	  
landowners	  in	  size	  category	  having	  cleared	  a	  type	  of	  land)	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